Misinformative advertising by Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
 
 








































IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Av. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Phone: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Phone: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 
Copyright © 2009 IESE Business School. 
Working Paper 
WP-809 
July, 2009  
 






























The Public-Private Center is a Research Center based at IESE Business School. Its 
mission is to develop research that analyses the relationships between the private and 
public sectors primarily in the following areas: regulation and competition, innovation, 
regional economy and industrial politics and health economics.   
Research results are disseminated through publications, conferences and colloquia. 
These activities are aimed to foster cooperation between the private sector and public 
administrations, as well as the exchange of ideas and initiatives.  
The sponsors of the SP-SP Center are the following:  
•  Accenture 
•  Ajuntament de Barcelona 
•  Caixa Manresa 
•  Cambra Oficial de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona 
•  Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya 
•  Departamento de Economía y Finanzas de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
•  Departamento de Innovación, Universidades y Empresa de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
•  Diputació de Barcelona 
•  Endesa 
•  Fundació AGBAR 
•  Garrigues 
•  Mediapro 
•  Microsoft 
•  Sanofi Aventis 
•  VidaCaixa 
The contents of this publication reflect the conclusions and findings of the individual 
authors, and not the opinions of the Center's sponsors.  
 













This paper analyzes how advertising can be used to mislead rivals in an oligopoly environment 
with demand uncertainty. In particular, we examine a two-period game in whichtwo firms each 
sell a differentiated product whose attractiveness vis-à-vis the competitor's product is 
unknown. In each period, a firm sets prices for its product and exerts an advertising effort that 
is imperfectly observed by the rival later on. Advertising is persuasive in that it enhances 
willingness to pay, but it can also be used to manipulate rivals' beliefs about initially 
unobservable differences in consumers' quality perceptions. In equilibrium, each firm uses 
advertising to persuade consumers and to interfere with the rival's learning about this unknown 
dimension of demand. This can be done because the effect of imperfectly observed advertising 
cannot be separated out of the effect of the unknown quality differential, which creates a signal 
extraction problem for the competitor. There always exists a continuum of (symmetric) 
equilibria, but refining the equilibrium set selects out a unique one in which firms price in the 
first-period as in the static equilibrium, whereas the misinformative usage of advertising makes 
firms underadvertise if and only if the marginal cost of advertising is high enough. 
JEL Code: L13, M21.  
 
Keywords: Signal-Jamming, Imperfect Observability, Persuasive Advertising, Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium, Strategic Complementary. 
* Universitat Pompeu Fabra and IESE SP-SP. E-mail: fran.ruiz@upf.edu. I am very grateful to Nicholas Argyres, Ramón 
Casadesús-Masanell, Sjaak Hurkens, Dmitri Kuksov, Gastón Llanes, David Myatt, Jackson Nickerson, Martin Peitz, Jennifer 
Reinganum, Xavier Vives, Govert Vroom, and participants at the IESE SP-SP Lunch Seminar and the 2009 CRES Foundations 
of Business Strategy Conference for valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Ignatius Horstmann for 
a very insightful and thought-provoking discussion. Financial support from the IESE Public-Private Sector Research Center 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
1 Universitat Pompeu Fabra and IESE SP-SP Center 
 1 Introduction
Demand uncertainty is an element most ￿rms have to cope with when making decisions rang-
ing from investment in (in)tangible assets or technology development to product assortment
and product design. Although some random elements a⁄ecting demand may have a transi-
tory character, some other elements may be largely permanent, such as how substitutable
consumers perceive products to be. As forcefully argued by Rothschild (1974), this creates
an incentive for a ￿rm to learn about the permanent features of the demand that it faces.1
Learning about demand is not an easy process because signals are typically received with some
noise (e.g., the random elements that are purely temporary), or because this learning process
may depend on variables used by competitors to enhance the quantity demanded of their
product, such as price or advertising e⁄ort. Indeed, in the presence of strategic interaction
among rivals￿learning processes, there is scope for manipulation in that a ￿rm acknowledges
that its activities can a⁄ect its rivals￿learning about the random elements of demand, as
analyzed by Keller and Rady (2003) in a price competition environment.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate how a ￿rm learns about some unobserv-
able drivers of demand in a setting in which competing ￿rms set prices and also undertake
promotional activities that are hard to monitor by rivals. In particular, we analyze how im-
perfectly observable advertising e⁄ort can be used to interfere with a competitor￿ s learning of
those demand drivers about which it is uncertain. Because we assume that advertising e⁄ort
cannot be perfectly observed by a competitor, the most obvious cases to which our framework
applies are those in which promotional activities are private. For instance, many (retailing)
￿rms use direct-mail advertising to inform consumers about their product o⁄erings (or about
their existence). As another example, sales representatives in many industries make private
visits to customers/retailers in order to persuade them about the goodness of a product. Al-
though all these settings may come to mind more naturally, it is worth remarking that our
theoretical insights also apply to public promotional activities as long as it is too costly to
monitor all those done by a competitor, as is typically the case. In short, our model is not
applicable whenever monitoring costs are so low that a competitor ￿nds it optimal to monitor
a ￿rm￿ s promotional activities so as to accurately quantify their e⁄ectiveness.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is not to explain why ￿rms do advertising, but
rather to examine whether there is an incentive to increase or decrease promotional intensity
whenever there is demand uncertainty and advertising is not perfectly observed by competi-
tors. Besides drawing implications for pricing and advertising strategies in these environments,
1See Keller and Rady (1999) for an analysis of this incentive that is richer than that in Rothschild (1974).
See also Mazzola and McCardle (1996) for a similar idea in a context in which there is uncertainty about
current production costs owing to an unknown learning curve.
1we also aim at drawing empirical predictions for temporal patterns of prices and advertising
expenditures. To accomplish these objectives, we analyze a two-period model in which two
￿rms choose price and advertising at each period. Products are both horizontally and verti-
cally di⁄erentiated, but ￿rms are initially unsure of the degree of substitutability between the
two products. In particular, we assume for simplicity that the extent of horizontal di⁄eren-
tiation is known with certainty; however, ￿rms cannot directly observe which product would
be perceived to be most desirable to the eyes of consumers in the absence of horizontal di⁄er-
ences.2 Hence, there are some drivers of demand that are random and unobservable to ￿rms.
Besides setting prices, ￿rms can also enhance their per-period sales by doing advertising, as
in Dixit and Norman￿ s (1978) oligopoly model of persuasive advertising.
If a ￿rm￿ s price and advertising e⁄ort were perfectly observed by the rival, then the latter
could perfectly recover the quality di⁄erential when observing past sales. However, we focus
on those situations in which, unlike the price charged, a ￿rm￿ s advertising e⁄ort cannot be
perfectly observed by the competitor at the beginning of the second period. As a result, ￿rms
face a statistical identi￿cation problem when trying to infer the realized quality di⁄erential
owing to the imperfect observability of the competitor￿ s advertising e⁄ort. A ￿rm￿ s inferred
quality di⁄erential will therefore depend on how much advertising the rival is believed to have
done and on how much advertising the rival has actually done. Because the advertising actu-
ally done by the competitor is unobservable, it follows that the competitor can strategically
manipulate the ￿rm￿ s inference about the realization of the quality di⁄erential.
Since second-period competition critically depends on the realized quality di⁄erential, each
￿rm has an incentive to manipulate the rival￿ s inference with the aim of softening future com-
petitive interaction, as in any other signal-jamming oligopoly model (Riordan 1985). Although
there exist in￿nitely many equilibria, a commonly used restriction on the o⁄-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs yields that the unique (symmetric) equilibrium exhibits a ￿rst-period price equal
to that charged in the static equilibrium, and an advertising e⁄ort that is properly adjusted
with the aim of softening future competition. In particular, we show that the advertising
e⁄ort is lower than that exerted in the static equilibrium if and only if advertising costs are
su¢ ciently high. Because ￿rms perfectly learn their realized demand functions along the equi-
librium path, it follows when the advertising technology is time-invariant that the expected
time trend for advertising expenditures is positive if and only if advertising costs are high
2There might be several reasons for this uncertainty to arise: for example, the brand equity of ￿rms to the
eyes of consumers in the case of search goods, or unobservable past experiences and word-of-mouth e⁄ects in
the case of experience goods. On the other hand, given that products have multidimensional characteristics, it
is typically very hard to assess whether a particular combination of vertical attributes is preferred by consumers
over another one (e.g., a recordable cassette tape vs. a more resistant, higher audio quality, but non-recordable
CD). Because it is very di¢ cult in practice to disentangle vertical di⁄erentiation from horizontal di⁄erentiation,
this is another environment to which our setting may apply.
2enough.
Our paper contributes to the literature on signal-jamming in imperfect competition set-
tings. Several papers deal with oligopoly pricing behavior in this type of environments. The
seminal paper by Riordan (1985) illustrates the signal-jamming role of unobservable prices or
quantities: in the presence of demand uncertainty, his prediction is that the market price is
expected to decrease (grow) over time if competitive interaction displays strategic complemen-
tarity (substitutability). In turn, the paper by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) analyzes how an
incumbent tries to predate a newly established ￿rm by manipulating the entrant￿ s inference
about its ￿xed cost of production. Their main result is that that signal-jamming does not
a⁄ect the incentive to exit, but it does discourage entry because of the incumbent￿ s incentive
to charge lower prices and thus interfere with the entrant￿ s inference problem.
Other papers do not study how a ￿rm tries to manipulate its competitors￿learning process,
but rather they focus on how to interfere with consumers￿inferences, an aspect that is not
examined in the current paper. For instance, in the setting considered by Caminal and Vives
(1996), both consumers and ￿rms are uncertain about the quality di⁄erential of two products,
and consumers infer it based on noisily observed sales. Because ￿rms observe each other￿ s
price and sales, they do not try to manipulate the competitor￿ s inference process, but rather
they signal-jam consumers￿inferences about the quality di⁄erential by slashing prices below
the static equilibrium level. Hence, the paper provides a rationale for aggressive battles for
market share based on signal-jamming actions taken by ￿rms. In the more recent paper by
Iyer and Kuksov (2009), each of two ￿rms chooses the intrinsic quality of its product together
with some other variable that in￿ uences consumers￿perception of the product quality (e.g.,
merchandising). These two costly choices are observed by the competing ￿rm, but not by con-
sumers, who make purchase decisions based on the joint e⁄ect of these two variables chosen by
￿rms. Because consumers cannot disentangle intrinsic quality from these "atmospherics" when
deciding whether or not to purchase a product, there arises an incentive to use atmospherics in
order to signal-jam consumers￿inferences about the intrinsic quality of a product. Hence, the
paper provides a rationale for using merchandising grounded on its role as a signal-jamming
device.
Both Riordan (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) posit that the relevant strategic
variable (price or quantity) is always unobservable to the competitor. In our paper, a ￿rm
does not signal-jam through price, which is observable, but through advertising e⁄ort, which
cannot be perfectly observed by the competing ￿rm. Hence, this parallels the literature on
quality signaling in monopoly, which emphasizes that prices and/or advertising can be used as
a signaling device.3 In signaling models of advertising, a monopolist has private information
3Bagwell and Riordan (1991) emphasize the role of prices in signaling quality when the monopolist and a
3about the quality of its product, and it signals quality through advertising e⁄ort (and price).
By contrast, our oligopoly framework assumes that ￿rms are symmetrically uninformed about
the relative quality of their products (but consumers are not), and they learn about the
realized quality di⁄erential over time, taking into account that each is able to manipulate
the competitor￿ s inference process through advertising. As a result, we highlight the signal-
jamming role of advertising when advertising expands market size, whereas previous literature
has highlighted the signaling role that advertising has about product quality even if advertising
is purely dissipative. Our empirical predictions are also di⁄erent from those in the monopoly
signaling literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game-theoretic model and
describes the solution concept employed for solving it. Section 3 solves the game when second-
period advertising costs are very high, and Section 4 pays particular attention to a certain
type of symmetric equilibrium. Section 5 generalizes the lesson drawn from the previous two
sections when advertising costs are not very high, whereas Section 6 concludes with directions
for future research. An appendix to the paper presents qualitatively similar results derived
from an alternative model in which advertising expands market size by informing consumers
about the features of a product such as price.
2 The model
We examine a two-period game with two kinds of players.4 On the one hand, there exists a
unit mass of unit-demand consumers distributed along a Hotelling segment of unit length.5
On the other hand, there are two ex ante identical ￿rms, labeled 1 and 2, which are risk-
neutral and discount future pro￿ts at a common rate ￿ 2 [0;1). Firm 1 is located at the left
end of the segment and ￿rm 2 is at the other extreme, and both produce goods at a constant
marginal cost equal to zero (this is just a normalization without any loss of generality). Firm
i 2 f1;2g chooses in each period the price pi at which to sell each unit of the product as well
as advertising level ai. Firm i￿ s cost of exerting advertising e⁄ort ai in period ￿ 2 f1;2g is
fraction of all consumers know the quality of a newly launched product. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) are the
￿rst to formally analyze how both price and advertising e⁄ort can be used for signaling quality in a repeat-
purchase environment, whereas Hertzendorf (1993) extends their model to those situations in which consumers
imperfectly observe advertising e⁄ort. See Bagwell (2007) for a thorough and deep survey of the economics
and marketing literatures on advertising.
4See Vives (2009) for a general treatment of two-period games in which ￿rms compete in pricing and
advertising e⁄ort in the absence of signal-jamming.
5Any consumer is atomistic in that she cannot a⁄ect ￿rms￿second-period actions and beliefs just by herself.
As a result, her ￿rst-period decision is purely static because she does not need to account for the outcome of





, where k1 and k2 are positive constants. For simplicity, we let k2 = 1, so that
second-period advertising e⁄ort is always zero for any of the ￿rms. (We relax this assumption
in Section 5.)




i (ai;pi) = V + e vi + ai ￿ pi ￿ tx
when purchasing one unit of the good,6 where V and t are positive scalars with the standard
interpretation in a Hotelling setup, whereas e v1 and e v2 are positive continuous random variables
with the same mean. The random variables are drawn just once, at the beginning of the game,
and the values drawn are never observed by ￿rms (although the realization of their di⁄erence
can be inferred based on the ￿rst-period actions and outcomes, as we shall see). The random
variable e v ￿ e v1￿e v2 represents the valuation di⁄erential in favor of ￿rm 1, and it is assumed to
have a positive continuous density g(v) on the interval [v;v], where v < 0 < v.7 The standard
deviation of the valuation di⁄erential e v is denoted by ￿. Notice that the assumption that
R v
v vg(v)dv = 0 implies that no product is ex ante vertically di⁄erentiated, although g(v) need
not be symmetric about zero.
We now describe the information structure of the game regarding which actions are observ-
able and which ones are not. In this sense, it is assumed that ￿rst-period prices are observed
by the competitor at the beginning of the second period, but advertising levels are never ob-
served by the rival. Unlike ￿rms, consumers do observe the realization of e v + a1 ￿ a2 when
making their purchase decisions based on observed prices.8 Whether the realized valuation
di⁄erential can be separated out of the di⁄erence in advertising e⁄orts is immaterial for the
analysis and for the results, so we will make no particular assumption in this regard.
We follow the seminal work by Riordan (1985) in that our solution concept for this dynamic
game with imperfect information will be that of pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). In our context, equilibrium strategies must be sequentially rational given a system
of beliefs and the system of beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium strategies in a
Bayesian way. We add a natural requirement to the PBE solution concept in order to rule out
irrational belief formation o⁄the equilibrium path. Thus, beliefs formed out of the equilibrium
6Note that advertising does not have a long-lasting impact (i.e., second-period utility does not depend on
￿rst-period advertising e⁄ort). However, the misinformative e⁄ect of advertising persists as long as a fraction
of ￿rst-period advertising is short-lived, even if this fraction is negligible. On the other hand, it is worth
remarking that qualitatitive results do not depend on all consumers being equally a⁄ected by advertising
e⁄ort.
7The values of v and v are not too far away from zero so that solutions are always interior.
8Despite the assumption that consumers observe the value of v +a1 ￿a2, it is worth noting that they have
no incentive to truthfully reveal it if asked by any of the ￿rms, so our results are robust in this sense.
5path about the advertising e⁄ort done by the rival and about the unknown quality di⁄erential
should be consistent with all the information available to the ￿rm. In particular, taking into
account that a ￿rm knows the advertising level it chose in the ￿rst period and the price that
both charged, we require that beliefs about the advertising e⁄ort exerted by the competitor
and about the random valuation di⁄erential be consistent with observed sales. Even with this
extra rationality requirement, there will be a large number of outcomes that can be sustained
in a PBE because Bayes￿rule is not applicable out of the equilibrium path, so we will impose
some reasonable restrictions on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs after having characterized the
set of PBE. This contrasts with Riordan￿ s (1985) unique symmetric equilibrium in which
(essentially) all ￿rst-period choices are shown to be on the equilibrium path because of their
unobservability. In our setting, some ￿rst-period choices (prices) are observable, but others
are not (advertising).9 Therefore, there can be prices not expected on the equilibrium path
with which we should associate some beliefs on the advertising e⁄ort that was exerted.10
Before characterizing the solution to the game, we would like to note that there are some
assumptions that seem critical for obtaining our results, even though they are not. Aside from
noting that advertising cannot be interpreted as secret price-cutting because it is a ￿xed cost
that does not vary with output, we now discuss why two main ingredients of our model should
not be taken at face value because they are not essential for the results to obtain.
On the one hand, we have assumed that the advertising done by a ￿rm is unobservable to
the competitor. Hence, advertising in our model may directly capture private activities such
as direct-mail advertising, on-site promotions or visits to customers to explain the advantages
of a good or service. However, it is important to remark that it may refer as well to public
activities (such as media advertising intended to reinforce a ￿rm￿ s brand equity) insofar as
they are imperfectly observed by the rival. Indeed, results are exactly the same if advertising
e⁄ort is observed by the competitor with some (vanishingly small) noise: for example, if at
the beginning of the second period ￿rm i￿ s rival observes e ￿ai, where ai denotes ￿rm i￿ s ￿rst-
period advertising e⁄ort and e ￿ is an independent random variable with positive density on
(0;1). The key driver of our results is that ￿rms face an identi￿cation problem when making
inferences about the realized v based on ￿rst-period sales because they are unsure of how much
9See Dana (2001) for a setting in which prices are observed by consumers but inventories accumulated by
￿rms are not, which also leads to a large number of equilibria depending on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs
held by consumers about the inventories carried by ￿rms upon observing an unexpected price.
10There are are some (out-of-equilibrium) advertising levels that can result in a ￿rm believing that the
realized valuation di⁄erential is smaller or larger than it can possibly be (even if the price is kept at its
equilibrium level). As explained in detail by Riordan (1985), this is not a problem if one modi￿es the framework
and introduces an arbitrarily small prior probability that any nonnegative advertising level could be observed
by the rival. In such a case in which Bayes￿rule is applicable to all advertising levels, ￿rms simply interpret an
unexpected advertising e⁄ort as being entirely driven by the noise, and the PBE solution concept is equivalent
to that of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982).
6advertising e⁄ort has been done by the rival.11 The assumption of complete unobservability
of advertising e⁄ort merely simpli￿es the analysis without a⁄ecting the underlying substance
of the results: what is critical is that the rival￿ s advertising e⁄ort cannot be fully disantangled
from some unobservable drivers of demand, thus creating an incentive to engage in signal-
jamming.
On the other hand, note that our setting is one of persuasive advertising because an
increase in ai directly leads to an increase in Ux
i . It is important to remark that advertising
need not be persuasive in order for an incentive to use it as a signal-jamming instrument to
arise, though. We have chosen this speci￿cation just because of its analytical simplicity. As
should become clear, the insights stemming from this model are general and do not depend
on whether advertising is done in order to persuade consumers or for other reasons such as
informing them about some product features (e.g., the price at which a product is sold).
Indeed, the appendix to this paper presents a model in which advertising is not persuasive
and still has a misinformative role. In this alternative environment, advertising is done to
increase awareness of a ￿rm￿ s product features, a setting that might be particularly appropriate
whenever advertising activities are public but imperfectly observable because it is hard to
believe that the rival can perfectly monitor how many consumers are being exposed to such
promotional activities.
3 Resolution of the model
Throughout this section, it is assumed that tk1 > (9 + ￿)=36 to ensure that payo⁄ functions
are strictly concave. Before solving the game, it is useful to examine how sales are generated
in the ￿rst period whenever all consumers purchase one of the two goods for sale (i.e., the
market is fully covered). Given f(pi;ai)g2
i=1, we have that the consumer x indi⁄erent between
both ￿rms is given by Ux
1(a1;p1) = U
1￿x
2 (a2;p2). Denoting the realized quality di⁄erential by
v = v1 ￿ v2 and doing some manipulations yields that
x =
t + a1 ￿ a2 + p2 ￿ p1 + v
2t
.
Because all consumers to the left of x must purchase ￿rm 1￿ s product, it follows that ￿rm 1￿ s
actual sales would be
q1 =
t + a1 ￿ a2 + p2 ￿ p1 + v
2t
,
11Whether or not a ￿rm can observe the competitor￿ s ￿rst-period sales is irrelevant, since such sales do not
convey any information that is not already contained in the ￿rm￿ s own ￿rst-period sales.
7whereas ￿rm 2￿ s actual sales would be
q2 =
t + a2 ￿ a1 + p1 ￿ p2 ￿ v
2t
.
We now proceed to solve the game backwards with the aid of these results. So suppose that
the equilibrium strategies prescribe that ￿rm i 2 f1;2g charges price pi and exerts advertising
e⁄ort ai in the ￿rst period. Suppose without loss of generality that ￿rm 2 has possibly deviated
from this strategy and instead has charged price p2 and exerted advertising e⁄ort a2.12 Let
b a2(p2) be ￿rm 1￿ s belief about the advertising level done by its rival in the ￿rst period when it
observes price p2 being charged in the ￿rst period. (Of course, it holds that b a2(p2) = a2 even
if a2 6= a2 because ￿rm 1 believes that this is an on-equilibrium-path event given that price
p2 was charged by ￿rm 2 in the ￿rst period.) Then after observing sales of q1 and ￿rm 2￿ s
￿rst-period price p2, ￿rm 1￿ s inferred valuation di⁄erential b v should be given by the following
equation because of the belief consistency requirement we imposed out of the equilibrium
path:
b v = 2tq1 ￿ t ￿ a1 + b a2(p2) ￿ p2 + p1.
Since it actually holds that q1 = (t+a1 ￿a2 +p2 ￿p1 +v)=2t, we have that ￿rm 1￿ s estimate
of the realized value of the random variable as a function of a2, p2 and v is as follows:
b v(a2;p2 jv) = v + b a2(p2) ￿ a2.
Unlike ￿rm 1, ￿rm 2 can perfectly identify the realized value of the valuation di⁄erential
based upon its ￿rst-period sales. However, ￿rm 1 believes that ￿rm 2￿ s estimate of the quality
di⁄erential is b v (we will typically suppress the arguments of b v(￿) to save space). Therefore,
given second-period prices (p0
1;p0
2), ￿rm 1 believes that the location of the indi⁄erent consumer
is given by b x = (t ￿ p0
1 + p0
2 + b v)=2t, and hence it believes that ￿rm 2 solves the following










2 ￿ b v)=2tg.
The objective function is strictly concave, so it follows that ￿rm 1 believes that ￿rm 2 best
responds by choosing ￿ p2 = (t + p0
1 ￿ b v)=2 when ￿rm 1 chooses price p0
1. Firm 1 solves the
12Recall that checking for a Nash equilibrium only requires ruling out unilateral deviations. Because we
shall focus on symmetric PBE, there is no loss of generality in considering unilateral deviations by one of the
￿rms, 2 say.










1 + b v)=2tg.
So solving the ￿rst-order conditions of this maximization programme taking into account that
p0
2 = ￿ p2 ￿ (t + p0
1 ￿ b v)=2 yields that ￿rm 1 charges a price of p￿




of the quality di⁄erential is b v.
However, ￿rm 2 knows the true realization of e v and is also aware of ￿rm 1 charging a price
of p￿
1(b v) = t +
b v
3
, so it solves
￿
￿







1(b v) ￿ p
00
2 ￿ v)=2tg.










(6t + b v ￿ 3v)2
72t
.




















at prices for which the belief function is di⁄erentiable.
We now turn to analyzing play in the ￿rst period. We restrict our attention to symmetric
(Perfect Bayesian) equilibria in which ￿rm i 2 f1;2g charges price pi = p and exerts advertising
e⁄ort ai = a. For given ￿rm 1￿ s ￿rst-period actions, ￿rm 2 should have no incentive to
charge a di⁄erent price from p and/or exert an advertising e⁄ort di⁄erent from a (taking into
consideration how subsequent play and beliefs would be a⁄ected if it deviates from one of
these choices). As usual in this kind of games, there is a large number of symmetric equilibria
because the solution concept does not impose any requirement on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs. In the current section, we give a (partial) characterization of the full set of possible
equilibria without any restriction other than symmetry. In the next section, though, we will
restrict our attention to certain type of o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that pin down a unique
symmetric PBE.
9Given that ￿rm 1 charges p and exerts advertising e⁄ort a, and taking into account that
R v
v vg(v)dv = 0, we have that ￿rm 2￿ s expected stream of discounted pro￿ts as a function of
its price p2 and advertising a2 is as follows:
￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2)) =






















6t ￿ 2v + b a2(p2) ￿ a2
36t
)g(v)dv ￿ k1a2.
Using the assumption that
R v
v vg(v)dv = 0, noting that tk1 > (9+￿)=36 ensures the strict con-
cavity of ￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2)) with respect to its ￿rst argument, and equating @￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2))=@a2
to zero yields the optimal advertising e⁄ort that ￿rm 2 must necessarily exert if it charges
price p2 (given the beliefs this price will induce):
a
￿
2(p2 jb a2(p2)) =
18p2 ￿ ￿(6t + b a2(p2))
36tk1 ￿ ￿
. (3)
As a shorthand for a￿
2(p2 jb a2(p2)), we will sometimes abuse notation and write a￿
2(p2) instead.
To characterize the entire set of possible symmetric PBE of the game, suppose that an
equilibrium exhibits both ￿rms choosing a price p and an advertising level a =
18p ￿ 6t￿
36tk1
(as follows from letting a￿
2(pjb a2(p)) = a and b a2(p) = a in (3) and then solving for a). Easy
manipulations using that
R v
v vg(v)dv = 0 and
R v
v v2g(v)dv = ￿2 show that a ￿rm￿ s expected
stream of discounted pro￿ts equals
￿(p) ￿ ￿2(a;pja) =






Although the second term is always positive, we will require that the ￿rst term be non-









t(6tk1 + ￿ +
p
12tk1 (3tk1 + 4￿))
3
. (5)
13The second term arises because second-period pro￿ts are strictly convex in v along the equilibrium path
(i.e., whenever b v = v), so Jensen￿ s inequality implies that E(￿￿
2(b v)) > ￿￿
2(E(b v)) despite ￿rms are risk-neutral
(E(￿) denotes the expectation operator).
14When deriving the bounds for the admissible values for p, note that we are using the fact that ￿ ￿ 0 >
t(6tk1 + ￿ ￿
p
12tk1 (3tk1 + 4￿))=3 for ￿ 2 [0;36tk1).
10This shows that it is not possible to have p < 0 in equilibrium.
Given some belief function b a2(￿), it should hold that no ￿rm has an incentive to deviate if
the rival is sticking to the equilibrium strategy, that is, we should have that
￿(p) ￿ ￿2(a
￿
2(p2);p2 jb a2(p2)) for all p2 6= p.
As mentioned earlier, the concept of PBE does not put restrictions on the belief function b a2(￿)
(except that b a2(p) = a). For this reason, we will look at the beliefs that are most favorable
to sustaining a symmetric equilibrium.15 For ￿xed p2 6= p, minimizing ￿2(a￿
2(p2);p2 jb a2(p2))










￿6t) (with the understanding that p2 6= p) as the "most favorable belief function."
Working with this belief system, we have the following result.16
Proposition 1 There is small enough " ￿ 0 such that there always exists a symmetric equi-






, with " > 0 if and only if ￿ > 0.
Proof. We ￿rst study conditions under which it holds that ￿(p) ￿ ￿2(a￿
2(p2);p2 jb a1
2 (p2)) for
all p2 6= p (where b a1
2 (p2) = max(0;
p2
2tk1
￿6t) for p2 6= p), and then we examine what happens
in the speci￿c case that p = t.
To ￿nd the conditions for which ￿(p) ￿ ￿2(a￿
2(p2);p2 jb a1
2 (p2)) for all p2 6= p, we distinguish




When t ￿ a + p ￿ 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1), the fact that tk1 > 1=4 implies that ￿2(a￿
2(p2);p2 jb a1
2 (p2))
is maximized at b p
+
2 ￿
2tk1(t ￿ a + p)
4tk1 ￿ 1
￿ 12t2k1 (under the assumption that tk1 > 1=4).




2 ); b p
+
2




￿ 6t), where it can be shown that
￿
+(p) =






Using (4) and (6), several manipulations show that we have that ￿(p) ￿ ￿+(p) if and only if
15This is standard in dynamic games with private information (e.g., Mailath 1987). Imposing re￿nements
that discard "unreasonable" o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs will typically reduce the equilibrium set, some-
times collapsing it into a singleton, as we show in the next section.
16Requiring that the indi⁄erent consumer attains a positive utility in equilibrium can be accomplished by
letting V be large enough.
11￿
+(p) ￿ 0, where
￿
+(p) ￿ 9k1p
2 ￿ 3p(6tk1 + ￿) + 9t
2k1 ￿ t￿(36tk1 ￿ 12 ￿ ￿).
Therefore, if a price p such that t￿a+p ￿ 6t(4tk1￿1) satis￿es ￿
+(p) ￿ 0 (and condition (5)),





On the other hand, if it holds that t￿a+p < 6t(4tk1￿1), then the assumption that tk1 >
(9+￿)=36 implies that ￿2(a￿
2(p2);p2 jb a1
2 (p2)) is maximized at b p
￿
2 ￿
(t ￿ a + p)(36tk1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 6t￿
2(36tk1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 18
<








￿0), where it can be shown that
￿
￿(p) =
[(t + p ￿
18p ￿ 6t￿
36tk1
)(36tk1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 6t￿]2








Using (4) and (7), tedious manipulations show that we have that ￿(p) ￿ ￿￿(p) if and only if
￿





























Therefore, if a price p such that t￿a+p < 6t(4tk1￿1) satis￿es ￿
￿(p) ￿ 0 (and condition (5)),









equilibrium, we must verify whether it holds that ￿
+(p) ￿ 0 if t ￿ a + p ￿ 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1)
and ￿
￿(p) ￿ 0 if t ￿ a + p < 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1). This is trivially satis￿ed for ￿ = 0 (since
￿
+(t) = ￿
￿(t) = 0), so let ￿ > 0 from now on. Consider ￿rst the case in which the parameter
space is such that t ￿ a + p ￿ 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1) for p = t, which is true if the following two
conditions hold at the same time: 1=4 < tk1 < 1=3 and 3 + 48tk1(3tk1 ￿ 1) < ￿ < 36tk1 ￿ 9.
Then ￿
+(t) = ￿t￿(36tk1 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿), so the assumption that ￿ < 36tk1 ￿ 9, together with the
fact that both t and ￿ are positive, implies that ￿
+(t) < 0.











1￿ + 72tk1￿ + ￿
2) ￿ 0.
Equivalently, letting
￿(tk1;￿) ￿ 9 + 864(tk1)
2 ￿ 6￿ ￿ 252(tk1) + 4(tk1)￿
2 ￿ 288(tk1)
2￿ + 72(tk1)￿ + ￿
2,
we need to prove that ￿(tk1;￿) ￿ 0 whenever it holds that t ￿ a + p < 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1) for p = t.
There are two cases for which t ￿ a + p < 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1). In both cases, it is su¢ cient to show
that ￿(tk1;￿) ￿ 0 for the largest admissible value for ￿, since
@2￿(tk1;￿)
@￿






= 80(tk1) ￿ 4 ￿ 288(tk1)2 < 0 (which holds because tk1 > 1=4). The ￿rst case
we deal with is that in which 1=4 < tk1 < 1=3 and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 + 48tk1(3tk1 ￿ 1). Because
￿(tk1;3 + 48tk1(3tk1 ￿ 1)) = (48tk1)
2(36(tk1)
3 ￿ 33(tk1)
2 + 10(tk1) ￿ 1),
it follows that ￿(tk1;3 + 48tk1(3tk1 ￿ 1)) > 0 for 1=4 < tk1 < 1=3, as desired. The second
and last case we need to study is that in which tk1 ￿ 1=3 (and hence ￿ < 1 < 36tk1 ￿ 9 ￿
3 + 48tk1(3tk1 ￿ 1)). Because
￿(tk1;1) = 576(tk1)
2 ￿ 176(tk1) + 4,
it follows that ￿(tk1;1) > 0 for tk1 ￿ 1=3, as desired.




(that p = t satis￿es condition (5) with strict inequalities is straightforward to show
using the assumptions that ￿ < 1 and 4tk1 > 1), whereas the facts that ￿(t) > 0, ￿
+(t) < 0,
and ￿
￿(t) < 0 for ￿ > 0, together with the continuity of ￿(￿), ￿
+(￿), and ￿
￿(￿), imply that
there must exist other equilibria in the neighborhood of this symmetric PBE.
Not only does this result prove that the equilibrium set is nonempty and in￿nitely large
for ￿ > 0,17 but also it shows that the ￿rst-period price could be greater, equal or lower than
the static price p = t charged when ￿ = 0. By Proposition 1, we know that there always
17The nonemptiness of this set does not depend on the parameter values, but the measure of the set does.
In fact, notice that despite we have just given a partial characterization of the equilibrium set, it is easy to
fully characterize it. In particular, price p will be charged in an equilibrium if it satis￿es (5), together with
￿
+(p) ￿ 0 (if t ￿ a + p ￿ 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1)) or ￿
￿(p) ￿ 0 (if t ￿ a + p < 6t(4tk1 ￿ 1)). It can be shown that
the equilibrium set is compact and connected. However, it is di¢ cult to perform comparative statics on the
determinants of its size (at least analytically).
13exists an equilibrium in which ￿rms price as in the static equilibrium. As we will see in the
next section, there are reasonable re￿nements on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that select
out this symmetric equilibrium as the unique one, so it is useful to characterize some of its
main properties.




decreasing in ￿, whereas ￿(p) =





is increasing in ￿.




ishes because of the misinformative e⁄ect of advertising. In addition, the advertising level
is distorted downwards in the equilibrium in which ￿rms price as in the static equilibrium.
That ￿rms underadvertise relative to the static equilibrium captures the common wisdom of
oligopoly models of signal-jamming. Thus, each ￿rm advertises less than in the static equi-
librium so as to try to fool the competitor in making it believe that the quality di⁄erential is
greater than it actually is. Why does it make sense for a ￿rm to try to induce its competi-
tor to believe that the valuation di⁄erential is greater than it actually is? The key point is
that doing so softens second-period price competition, which is in a ￿rm￿ s interest because of
strategic complementarity. However, in equilibrium no ￿rm is fooled and both act in the same
way, so second-period price competition is not relaxed. But because advertising dissipates
rents in a symmetric equilibrium, reducing advertising expenditures without vaying prices
and sales is positive for ￿rms, which explains why a ￿rm￿ s payo⁄grows with ￿, and hence the
misinformative e⁄ect of advertising results in greater payo⁄s for both ￿rms.
To sum up, recall that in our model advertising has a dual nature: persuasive and misin-
formative. The persuasive nature of advertising￿ present even if ￿ = 0￿ makes ￿rms futilely
engage in dissipative advertising, but this e⁄ect is partially o⁄set if p = t due to the misinfor-
mative nature of advertising that arises when ￿ > 0 (and k2 = 1).
4 Equilibrium re￿nements
Proposition 1 shows that there exists a continuum of symmetric PBE. That the set of equilibria
is very big is a standard ￿nding in dynamic games with private information because the
belief function is largely unrestricted. For this reason, part of the game-theoretic literature
has developed re￿nements that rule out "unreasonable" o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. The
purpose of this section is to sharpen our predictions by re￿ning the set of symmetric equilibria.
Throughout this section, we make the technical assumption that belief functions are twice
continuously di⁄erentiable in the (closed) neighborhood of the ￿rst-period equilibrium price p;
14in particular, we assume that they are di⁄erentiable at p2 2 Br(p) = fp2 ￿ 0 : jp2 ￿ pj ￿ 1=rg,
where Br(p) denotes the closed ball of radius 1=r > 0 centered at price p. (We will discuss
later why this is a very weak assumption for large enough r.) Under this assumption, we can
apply the envelope theorem when di⁄erentiating ￿2(a￿



















v vg(v)dv = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, it holds that a￿
2(p) = a and a￿






















Expression (8) highlights the great multiplicity of outcomes that can be sustained because
beliefs are unrestricted for p2 di⁄erent from p (despite our restriction on locally di⁄erentiable
belief functions), so additional constraints on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are required to
sharpen predictions.
Unfortunately, the re￿nements developed by the game-theoretic literature are not applica-
ble to many imperfect information games. For this reason, we shall consider a weaker version
of an assumption on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that is commonly used in the industrial
organization literature dealing with unobservable actions (e.g., Hart and Tirole 1990, McAfee
and Schwartz 1994, or Caminal and Vives 1996). In particular, this literature pays atten-
tion to "passive" out-equilibrium-path beliefs, which in our context means that b a2(p2) = a
for all p2, something which may not be very reasonable if the unexpected price p2 turns out
to be very di⁄erent from p. However, this assumption is more plausible if p2 2 Br(p) for
very small r, since observing a price almost identical to p may be interpreted as a small but
well-intended error when implementing prices. For this reason, we impose the restriction that
db a2(p2)
dp2
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
p2=p
= 0, which selects out the symmetric equilibrium in which p = t and a =
3 ￿ ￿
6k1
as the unique PBE. This equilibrium has some appealing properties that we already discussed
in the light of Corollary 1, so our discussion now will focus on the system of beliefs that
supports this equilibrium because there is an additional issue of robustness. To see this, let
us consider the following family of belief functions that supports this equilibrium (the family
18Note that tk1 > (9 + ￿)=36 implies that the payo⁄ function is strictly quasi-concave.









if p2 2 Br(t)
b a1
2 (p2) if p2 = 2 Br(t)
,
where Br(t) = fp2 ￿ 0 : jp2 ￿ tj ￿ 1=rg. This collection of functions can be made to be
arbitrarily close to the most favorable belief function b a1
2 (p2), since Br(t) ! ftg as r ! 1
implies that the limit of this sequence of functions and b a1
2 (p2) coincide almost everywhere.19
As a result, we have that a slight but reasonable perturbation in the belief system considered
in Section 3 selects out p = t and a =
3 ￿ ￿
6k1
as the unique symmetric equilibrium of the
game.20
Proposition 2 Suppose that b a2(p2) = b ar
2(p2). Then the unique symmetric PBE of the game
exhibits price p = t and advertising e⁄ort a =
3 ￿ ￿
6k1
for all r > 0.
Proof. Small (local) price deviations have just been ruled out for p2 2 Br(t) (see derivation
of (8)), whereas large (global) price deviations are not pro￿table for p2 = 2 Br(t) by Proposition
1.
19This also shows that our local di⁄erentiability assumption is very weak, since it can be made to apply
only to a set of arbitrarily small measure.
20Another plausible re￿nement that delivers uniqueness is based on a forward induction argument applied
locally on the neighborhood of the equilibrium price. Thus, letting a￿






































. This re￿nement is much more sophisticated than the one based on "passive
beliefs" in some sense. Thus, upon observing a price pretty close to the one expected in equilibrium, ￿rm 1
asks itself whether there is some advertising level such that if it believed ￿rm 2 did such advertising in the
￿rst period, then ￿rm 2 could do better and hence ￿rm 2 would actually exert such advertising e⁄ort (given
that ￿rm 1 would anticipate it). The (local) forward induction re￿nement considered discards these situations.
Hence, for those belief functions whose derivative at the equilibrium price coincides with that of a￿
2(p2), it
holds relative to the static equilibrium that price increases, whereas advertising done decreases if and only
if 2tk1 > 1. The latter result arises because of two con￿ icting e⁄ects. On the one hand, there is always an
incentive to signal-jam the competitor￿ s inference by underadvertising relative to the static equilibrium. On
the other, price and advertising are complements, so a ￿rm that for some exogenous reason unrelated to t or
k1 prices higher than in the static equilibrium should advertise more. The latter e⁄ect is powerful relative to
the former if and only if advertising is not too costly in the ￿rst period, which explains the result obtained
under forward induction.
165 Overadvertising vs. underadvertising
This section deals with the cases in which k2 < 1, although it is assumed throughout that
tk2 > 1=4 to ensure that second-period pro￿t functions are strictly concave in prices and
advertising levels. Our objective is to check whether Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 extend to
the cases in which ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to exert some advertising e⁄ort in the second period.
To better understand the features of competition when ￿rms choose price and advertising
e⁄ort in a signal -jamming environment, let us ￿rst consider second-period competition if the
quality di⁄erential were known to be equal to v. Understanding of this setting will shed a
light on the more complicated setup examined later, in which ￿rms use ￿rst-period advertising
to manipulate the rival￿ s perception of the realized valuation di⁄erential. As is standard in
static oligopoly games, we will require second-period Nash equilibria to be stable.
If v were perfectly observed by ￿rms at the beginning of the second period, ￿rms 1 and 2




































Instead of working with complex bidimensional reaction functions, it is more instructive to
work with a transformed game with a single strategic variable. Thus, note from (9) and (10)






, i = 1;2.
When 2tk2 < 1, da0
i=dp0
i > 1 and advertising varies in the same direction as price (as happens
in any model of persuasive advertising with increasing marginal cost of advertising), but in a





in (9) and (10) (this can be done because the optimal
a0
i depends on neither p0
3￿i nor a0
3￿i) allows us to transform the second-period game into one




































This is a game in prices in which it is implicit how advertising varies when prices are
17changed. The (second-period) reaction functions of the transformed game, denoted by Ri(￿)























So we have that the equivalent game in which prices are the single strategic variable for ￿rms
displays strategic complementarity if and only if 2tk2 > 1. The surprising cases are hence
those in which second-period competition exhibits strategic substitutability. In these cases in
which 2tk2 < 1, advertising varies in the same direction with price, but by a larger amount
(since da0
i=dp0
i > 1). As a result, an increase in price is accompanied by a larger increase
in advertising e⁄ort, which decreases the elasticity of the competitor￿ s residual demand, and
hence makes it slightly lower its price and substantially decrease its advertising.









￿ ￿. Given the linearity of reaction functions, stability simply








Let us call the (stable) Nash equilibrium point by (pe
1;pe
2) and let us parametrize it by v, so




1(v);v). As a result, it holds that
pe
1(v) = R1(R2(pe
















































> 0 because are analyzing the part of the parameter space in
which 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2. To better understand what happens when 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2, let us
suppose that ￿rm 1 is led to believe that the quality di⁄erential is greater that it actually is.





Figure 1: Shift in (perceived) reaction functions if 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2
The thick dashed line represents ￿rm 1￿ s reaction function when it is misled by ￿rm 2 to
believe that the quality di⁄erential is greater that it actually is. whereas the thick solid line
represents ￿rm 1￿ s reaction function if it is not misled. The thin dashed line represents ￿rm
1￿ s perception of ￿rm 2￿ s reaction function if ￿rm 1 is not misled, whereas the thin solid line
represents ￿rm 1￿ s perception of ￿rm 2￿ s reaction function if ￿rm 1 is not misled. As a result,
inducing ￿rm 1 to believe that the quality di⁄erential is greater than it really is leads to ￿rm
1 charging a higher price that it would otherwise, since dpe
1(v)=dv > 0.
It seems when 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2 that ￿rm 2 would be better o⁄by inducing ￿rm 1 to believe
that the quality di⁄erential is higher that it actually is, but this is not correct once we take
into account that this is a transformation of the original game. In fact, if ￿rm 1 were led
to believe that the valuation di⁄erential is lower that it actually is, then its price would be
lowered (since dpe
1(v)=dv > 0), but advertising would lower even more (since 2tk2 < 1), which
is in ￿rm 2￿ s interest. In short, when it holds that 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2, there arises an incentive
for ￿rms to overadvertise in the ￿rst period so as to lead the competitor to believe that the
quality di⁄erential is lower that it really is, and thus soften second-period competition because
the decrease in advertising e⁄ort is larger that the fall in price.
Based on the analysis for the two di⁄erent cases that can possibly arise, we are now in the
position of extending the results in Sections 3 and 4 to any ￿nite k2. Paralleling steps to those
followed in Section 3, it is easy to show that ￿rm 1 charges a price of p￿
1(b v) = t +
tk2b v
3tk2 ￿ 1







when its estimate of the quality




t((2k2(2t ￿ v) ￿ 1)(3tk2 ￿ 1) + (2tk2 ￿ 1)k2b v)
(3tk2 ￿ 1)(4tk2 ￿ 1)




(2k2(2t ￿ v) ￿ 1)(3tk2 ￿ 1) + (2tk2 ￿ 1)k2b v
2k2(3tk2 ￿ 1)(4tk2 ￿ 1)
.







2k2(2t ￿ v) ￿ 1 +




Under the maintained assumption that 3tk2 > 1, ￿￿
2(b v) is decreasing in b v if and only if it
holds that 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2. As a result, there is an incentive to underadvertise in the ￿rst
period whenever we have that 2tk2 > 1. Making the rival believe that the quality di⁄erential is
higher than it actually is results in an increase in price and in a smaller increase in advertising
e⁄ort, thus softening second-period competition. However, when 3tk1 > 1 > 2tk2 there
arises an incentive to overadvertise in the ￿rst period so as to mislead the competitor into
thinking that the valuation di⁄erential is lower than it actually is. This softens second-period
competition even though the price charged by the rival decreases, since its advertising e⁄ort
decreases even more.
We will skip the steps, but it can be shown that the unique symmetric PBE selected out by







.20 Hence, the general lesson one can draw from this PBE is that
the strategic variable that is observable is kept at the static equilibrium level, and the strategic
variable that is unobservable is adjusted so as to relax second-period price competition (as
long as ￿ > 0, of course). For tk2 2 (1=2;1), this means that ￿rms will underadvertise relative
to the static equilibrium, whereas the opposite happens for tk2 2 (1=3;1=2).























We can also draw predictions about the expected pattern of price and advertisement ex-
penditure. Thus, we have in equilibrium that the expected price in the second period is
20When 3tk2 > 1 > 2tk2, the nature of the most favorable belief function di⁄ers from the one derived in
Section 3, though.
20p0 = t, and hence price is not expected to vary over time. However, in the most likely
case that k1 = k2 ￿ k, it holds that the expected advertising e⁄ort in the second period is
equal to a0 =
1
2k







> a0 if and only if tk 2 (1=3;1=2), so we have the following.
Proposition 4 Price is expected to be constant over time. If k1 = k2 ￿ k, then advertising
is expected to grow over time if k 2 (
1
2t
;1), whereas advertising is expected to decrease over







Therefore, an increase in the marginal cost of advertising has a nonmonotonic e⁄ect on
the sign of a ￿ a0: for low k, sign(a ￿ a0) > 0, whereas for large k, sign(a ￿ a0) < 0.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the role of imperfectly observable advertising as a signal-jamming
device in a two-period duopoly. In particular, the paper has showed that there exist many
equilibria, all of which exhibit an attempt to strategically manipulate a competitor￿ s inference
about unobservable drivers of demand. Although in equilibrium no ￿rm is able to fool its
rival, the presence of these incentives to signal-jam learning about demand conditions may
result in a higher or a lower price and in a higher or a lower advertising e⁄ort than those
obtained in a static equilibrium.
We have also provided reasonable conditions under which the equilibrium outcome is
unique. In this re￿ned equilibrium, ￿rms price as they would in a static equilibrium, and
advertising is adjusted in an attempt to soften second-period competition, thus capturing
the received wisdom. In a setting in which advertising is persuasive, we have found that a
decrease in the marginal cost of advertising has a nonmonotonic e⁄ect on the sign of the
di⁄erence between the equilibrium advertising e⁄ort and that of the static equilibrium. In
particular, ￿rms underadvertise (relative to the static equilibrium) if and only if the marginal
cost of advertising is su¢ ciently high. Underadvertising results in less rent dissipation and
an expected positive time trend for advertising expenditures, whereas overadvertising leads
to more rents being dissipated owing to advertising and an expected negative time trend for
advertising expenditures.
That advertising grows over time is found in the paper by Horstmann and MacDonald
(2003) in their empirical study of the CD player industry. This study ￿nds little support to
the signaling role of advertising. Our paper may help to explain this evidence, although it
21cannot explain the decreasing time trend of the price path. However, it is well known that
the manufacture of CD players was subject to learning curve e⁄ects. It would be interesting
to extend our model by incorporating a learning curve, and it seems clear that such a model
could simultaneously explain a positive time trend for advertising expenditures and a negative
time trend for prices if there is a bit of cost reduction due to learning. (Whether this persists
for substantial cost reductions is an open question.) Hence, perhaps ￿rms were not signaling
quality, but actually they were using advertising to try to signal-jam learning about the
uncertain demand faced by each ￿rm.21
There is one more aspect not dealt with in the paper that might be worthwhile exploring
in detail. Thus, the paper has exclusively focused on the signal-jamming role that advertising
can play, leaving its signaling role aside by assuming private information away. This is useful
to isolate the e⁄ects that arise when ￿rms can manipulate each other￿ s inference processes
through unobservable advertising. The real world is more complex, though, and it seems
quite reasonable to assume that ￿rms receive a private signal about the quality of its product
(as perceived by consumers) before choosing price and advertising e⁄ort. In this case, the
signaling role of prices (and perhaps advertising) would interact with the signal-jamming role
that advertising would have. This would probably create a further incentive to soften second-
period competition, which may lead to excessively low prices in the ￿rst-period. We leave the
analysis of interaction between signaling and signal-jamming for future research.
21In fact, advertising data could only be observed with some noise by the rival ￿rms because data were
￿rm-speci￿c (and not model-speci￿c) and they were collected by a magazine issued monthly.
22Appendix
In this appendix, we provide an analysis of the misinformative role advertising in a context in
which advertising has no persuasive e⁄ects. Instead, we assume that ￿rms do advertising in
order to convey information about some features of their products (e.g., price). In this setting,
￿rms acknowledge that imperfectly observed advertising can also be used to signal-jam the
competitor￿ s inference about some unobservable drivers of demand.
The model we use is a duopoly variant of that in Grossman￿ s and Shapiro￿ s (1984) seminal
paper. We assume that there exists a unit mass of consumers who are identical and whose
preferences over a numØraire good (denoted by 0) and the goods supplied by ￿rms i and 3￿i
(i 2 f1;2g) are as follows:





It is assumed that e ￿ is a random variable with a positive continuous density g(￿) de￿ned on
the interval [￿;￿] ￿ <++. The mean and the variance are respectively denoted by ￿e and ￿2.
As in the model dealing with persuasive advertising, we assume that the realized value of e ￿
is always observed by consumers, but never by ￿rms.
We consider a two-period game in which consumers initially do not know of the existence
of ￿rms (or their products). Besides setting the price pi at which to sell its product, ￿rm
i 2 f1;2g can choose the advertising necessary to inform a fraction ai of consumers about its
existence and the features of its product, price included. The cost of doing advertising so as
to reach ai 2 [0;1] consumers is C(ai) = ka2
i=2. A consumer does not observe whether other
consumers have received an ad from ￿rm i, although this assumption is innocuous. To keep
matters as simple as possible, we also assume that all consumers know of the existence of
￿rms at the beginning of the second period, so ￿rms simply compete in prices in that period.
Given price competition with di⁄erentiated products, there should be an incentive to use
imperfectly observed advertising as a signal-jamming device with the aim of softening second-
period competition. In particular, a ￿rm choosing its ￿rst-period advertising e⁄ort would like
to lead its competitor to believe that the realized value of e ￿ is greater than it really is so that
the rival￿ s second-period price increases. This creates an incentive for a ￿rm to underadvertise
relative to the static equilibrium so that the competitor receives higher sales than it would
in the absence of the misinformative role of advertising. The analysis below simply con￿rms
this intuition developed in the light of the model dealing with persuasive advertising.
Suppose that all consumers have a per-period income of Y > 0 to be spent in the numØraire
and/or in the products sold by each of the ￿rms. Conditional upon a consumer receiving an ad
from ￿rm i, we have that such consumer￿ s demand if she does not receive an ad from ￿rm 3￿i
23is qm
i (pi) ￿ 3(e ￿￿pi)=2. Conditional upon a consumer receiving an ad from ￿rm i, we have that
such consumer￿ s demand if she receives an ad from ￿rm 3 ￿ i is qd
i (pi;p3￿i) ￿ e ￿ + p3￿i ￿ 2pi.
Therefore, given realization ￿ and f(pi;ai)g2
i=1, sales in the ￿rst period are formed as follows:
qi = ai[(1 ￿ a3￿i)
3(￿ ￿ pi)
2
+ a3￿i(￿ + p3￿i ￿ 2pi)].
To solve the game backwards, suppose that the equilibrium strategies prescribe that ￿rm
i 2 f1;2g charges price pi and exerts advertising e⁄ort ai in the ￿rst period. Suppose also that
￿rm 2 has possibly deviated from this strategy and instead has charged price p2 and exerted
advertising e⁄ort a2. Then after observing sales of q1 and ￿rm 2￿ s ￿rst-period price p2, ￿rm
1￿ s inference b ￿ about the realized value of e ￿ would be given by the following equation:
q1 = a1[
3(1 ￿ b a2(p2))(b ￿ ￿ p1) + 2b a2(p2)(b ￿ + p2 ￿ 2p1)
2
],
where b a2(p2) denotes ￿rm 1￿ s belief about the advertising done by ￿rm 2 upon observing a ￿rst-
period price p2. However, it actually holds that q1 = a1[
3(1 ￿ a2)(￿ ￿ p1) + 2a2(￿ + p2 ￿ 2p1)
2
],
so we have that ￿rm 1￿ s estimate of the realized value of the random variable as a function of
a2, p2 and ￿ is as follows:
b ￿(a2;p2 j￿) =
(3 ￿ a2)￿ + (a2 ￿ b a2(p2))(2p2 ￿ p1)
3 ￿ b a2(p2)
.
As usual, we shall suppress the arguments of b ￿(￿) to ease exposition.
We now have all the information upon which each ￿rm makes decisions in the second
period. Recalling our assumption that all consumers are aware of the existence of ￿rms (and
of the price each charges) at the beginning of the second period, we have that ￿rm 1 believes







Therefore, ￿rm 1 solves the following programme (given its beliefs about the price charged





1(b ￿ + p0
2 ￿ 2p0
1)g. Solving the ￿rst-order condition after
taking into account that ￿ p2 = (b ￿ + p0
1)=4 yields that p￿
1(b ￿) = b ￿=3.






1(b ￿) ￿ 2p0
2)g, and hence it ￿nds it optimal to charge a second-period
price equal to p￿
2(b ￿) = (3￿ + b ￿)=12. Letting ￿￿





2(b ￿)), we have that
￿￿
2(b ￿) =







(3￿ + b ￿)(￿ + p1 ￿ 2p2)






4(3￿ + b ￿)(a2 ￿ b a2(p2))(3 ￿ b a2(p2)) + 2(3￿ + b ￿)(3 ￿ a2)(￿ ￿ 2p2 + p1)
db a2(p2)
dp2
72(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2
at prices at which the belief function is di⁄erentiable. Before proceeding to solve the ￿rst pe-
riod, note that the critical driver of the results is that @￿￿
2(b ￿)=@a2 < 0, so there is an incentive
for ￿rm 2 to signal-jam ￿rm 1￿ s inference about the realized value of e ￿ by underadvertising.
Doing so will lead ￿rm 1 to believe that second-period demand is greater than it really is, and
hence it will price higher than it would otherwise. This relaxes second-period competition and
allows ￿rm 2 to raise its second-period price.
Given that ￿rm 1 charges p and exerts advertising e⁄ort a, and taking into account that
R ￿
￿ ￿g(￿)d￿ = ￿e, we have that ￿rm 2￿ s expected stream of discounted pro￿ts as a function
of its price p2 and advertising a2 is as follows:
￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2)) = a2p2[

















(3￿ + b ￿)(￿ + p1 ￿ 2p2)
36(3 ￿ b a2(p2))
and
R ￿








e + ￿2 + ￿e(p ￿ 2p2))(9 ￿ 3b a2(p2) + 3 ￿ a2)
36(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2 ￿
￿(a2 ￿ b a2(p2))(2p2 ￿ p)(￿e + p ￿ 2p2)
36(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2 ￿ ka2.












2(p2 jb a2(p2)) is uniquely de￿ned and is
(typically) given by the solution to @￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2))=@a2 = 0.22 Because it must hold that
21This follows because
￿(￿e + p ￿ 2p2)2
36(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2 ￿ k ￿








￿ k ￿ 0,
where we have used the facts that b a2(p2) ￿ 1, ￿ < 1, p2 ￿ 0 and p ￿ ￿.
22Of course, a￿
2(p2 jb a2(p2)) = 1 for all p2 for which it holds that @￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2))=@a2 > 0 for all a2,
25a￿






= 0 allows us to relate
the equilibrium price and the equilibrium advertising e⁄fort:
9(2k + (￿e ￿ p)p)a
2 ￿ 54(k + (￿e ￿ p)p)a + 81(￿e ￿ p)p ￿ 2￿(￿
2
e + ￿
2 ￿ ￿ep) = 0. (11)







0, so using the shorthand a￿
2(p2) in lieu of a￿
2(p2 jb a2(p2)), one can easily show the following
















2(p2) ￿ b a2(p2))(12 ￿ 3b a2(p2) ￿ a￿
2(p2))
72(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2 +
4￿(a￿
2(p2) ￿ b a2(p2))2(2p2 ￿ p)
72(3 ￿ b a2(p2))2
Because a￿












The solution to the system of equations formed by (11) and (12) delivers the equilibrium
values (as long as the resulting a is neither smaller than 0 nor larger than 1). Note that the
equilibrium payo⁄ for each ￿rm is
￿(p) =










We now provide a numerical illustration of how this setting leads to underadvertising
relative to the static equilibrium (i.e., the one in which ￿ = 0). In our numerical examples,
we set k = 0:25 and ￿2 = 1, with ￿e = 1, which is without any loss of generality.23 Figure
2 shows how the equilibrium advertising e⁄ort decreases with the discount factor, as was
to be expected in the presence of the signal-jamming e⁄ect of advertising and the strategic
complementarity displayed by second-period product market competition:
whereas a￿
2(p2 jb a2(p2)) = 0 for all p2 for which it holds that @￿2(a2;p2 jb a2(p2))=@a2 < 0 for all a2.
23Setting ￿e = 1 is without loss of generality because it simply boils down to a standardization on p, ￿2, k,





as long as ￿ ￿ 5.
26Figure 2: Equilibrium advertising e⁄ort as a function of the discount factor
In this particular example, payo⁄s are increasing in ￿: underadvertising lowers costs and im-
plies greater market power vis-￿-vis those consumers who receive just one ad. Unlike the
persuasive advertising case, though, this may not be a general result because lowering adver-
tising expenditures has a negative e⁄ect in that the fraction of consumers who receive the
￿rm￿ s ad decreases.
27References
[1] Bagwell, K. (2007), ￿ The Economic Analysis of Advertising￿ , Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 3, North-Holland: 1701-1844.
[2] Bagwell, K. and Michael H. Riordan (1991), ￿ High and Declining Prices Signal Product
Quality￿ , American Economic Review, 81(1): 224-239.
[3] Caminal, R. and Xavier Vives (1996), ￿ Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-
Based Theory￿ , RAND Journal of Economics, 27(2): 221-239.
[4] Dana, J. D. (2001), ￿ Competition in Price and Availability when Availability is Unob-
servable￿ , RAND Journal of Economics, 32(4): 497-513.
[5] Dixit, A. K. and Victor Norman (1978), ￿ Advertising and Welfare￿ , Bell Journal of
Economics, 9(1): 1-17.
[6] Fudenberg, D. and Jean Tirole (1986), ￿ A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation￿ ,
RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3): 366-376.
[7] Grossman, G. M. and Carl Shapiro (1984), ￿ Informative Advertising with Di⁄erentiated
Products￿ , Review of Economic Studies, 51(1): 63-81.
[8] Hart, O. D. and Jean Tirole (1990), ￿ Vertical Integration and Market Forecluse￿ , Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, special issue: 205-276.
[9] Hertzendorf, M. N. (1993), ￿ I￿ m Not a High-Quality Firm-But I Play One on TV￿ , RAND
Journal of Economics, 24(2): 236-247.
[10] Horstmann, I. and Glenn MacDonald (2003), ￿ Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?
Evidence from the Compact Disc Player Market, 1983-1992￿ , International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 21(3): 317-345.
[11] Iyer, G. and Dmitri Kuksov (2009), ￿ Consumer Feelings and Equilibrium Product Qual-
ity￿ , Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.
[12] Keller, G. and Sven Rady (1999), ￿ Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environ-
ment￿ , Review of Economic Studies, 66(3): 475-507.
[13] Keller, G. and Sven Rady (2003), ￿ Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic
Di⁄erentiated-Goods Duopoly￿ , RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1): 138-165.
28[14] Kreps, D. M. and Robert Wilson (1982), ￿ Sequential Equilibria￿ , Econometrica, 50(4):
863-894.
[15] Mailath, G. J. (1987), ￿ Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum
of Types￿ , Econometrica, 55(6): 1349-1365.
[16] Mazzola, J. B. and Kevin F. McCardle (1996), ￿ A Bayesian Approach to Managing
Learning-Curve Uncertainty￿ , Management Science, 42(5): 680-692.
[17] McAfee, R. P. and Marius Schwartz (1994), ￿ Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Con-
tracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity￿ , American Economic Review,
84(1): 210-230.
[18] Milgrom, P. and John Roberts (1982), ￿ Price and Advertising Signals of Product Qual-
ity￿ , Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 796-821.
[19] Riordan, M. H. (1985), ￿ Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations￿ ,
RAND Journal of Economics, 16(1): 41-50.
[20] Rothschild, M. (1974), ￿ A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing￿ , Journal of
Economic Theory, 9(2): 185-202.
[21] Vives, X. (2009), ￿ Strategic Complementarity in Multi-Stage Games￿ , Economic Theory,
forthcoming.
29